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Introduction 
 
 The institutional arrangements established by new states will not by themselves 
determine their political viability or otherwise. Political viability is determined by a 
range of political variables from the nature of governing elites to the extent of state 
resources to the character of the national community. But the institutional system is a 
significant determinant of the capacity of governing political elites to govern. As a 
post-conflict state, Timor-Leste at independence was as a particularly vulnerable state. 
Its state structure increased that vulnerability: it adopted a semi-presidential system 
that established two, rival power centres: that centred on President Xanana Gusmão 
and that centred on Prime Minister Marí Alkatiri (Shoesmith, 2003: 232). This rivalry 
reached its climax in the crisis of 2006 and the forced resignation of the Prime 
Minister. 
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Drawing on the experience of both the Alkatiri Fretilin Government (2002-2007) and 
its Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) successor (2007 onwards), this paper puts 
the case for constitutional reform. The argument is based on the need to establish both 
a more effective and a more democratic system of governance in Timor-Leste. In 
particular, it is argued that Timor-Leste needs a strengthened legislature, able to 
exercise scrutiny and oversight of the executive, interrogating ministers and critically 
reviewing the policy process. In emerging democracies the executive branch tends to 
dominate the legislature. Morgan (2005) found executive dominance to be typical of 
the Melanesian parliamentary systems in his comparative study. Typically, new 
multiparty parliaments lack the experience, the financial and human resources and the 
confidence to play an autonomous role in the policy process (NDI, 2000: 4). This has 
been the case in Timor-Leste since independence in 2002. It has created a situation 
where the political executive, the Council of Ministers, has been tempted to introduce 
laws (under the Decree Law system) that flout democratic principles and introduce 
major political changes without reference to the parliament. It is a temptation that 
both the Fretilin Government and the AMP Government have been unable to resist. 
 
In the Timor-Leste case, it is necessary to understand the executive-legislative 
relationship in the setting of a semi-presidential system where the first and second 
presidents of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão and 
Dr José Ramos-Horta, have been outstanding political figures. The relationship is 
triangular between president, prime minister and parliament. Timor-Leste does not 
have a Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. It is a hybrid model where 
the electorate directly chooses both the parliament and the president.  
 
The key is the nature of the parliament’s relationship with the other ‘organs of 
sovereignty’, the President and the Government (the political executive). The fourth 
‘organ of sovereignty’, the judiciary, has so far played a very limited role. A Supreme 
Court has not yet been appointed and the Court of Appeals assumes the Supreme 
Court’s responsibilities set out in the Constitution (Sections 124, 125, 126). This 
includes oversight of political parties (Section 126 (1: e)) and the electoral process 
(Section 126 (2: c)). 
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Does Timor-Leste need a more powerful parliament? 
 
There has now been an experience of parliamentary democracy in Timor-Leste for 
some six years. This includes the workings of two distinct parliamentary regimes: that 
of the Fretilin-dominated parliament of the 2002-2007 period and that of the current 
Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) government. The role of the Council of 
Ministers and of the Prime Minister in these two periods has changed from a single, 
highly centralised executive to a multiparty executive drawn from the five AMP 
member parties.  
 
In terms of democratic government that is participatory and transparent, M Steven 
Fish’s conclusion from his comparative study (2006) is  that ‘the evidence shows that 
the presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for democratization’. 
Fish found that on his case studies, every country that opted for a strong legislature 
also scored high on Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties. 
Timor-Leste does not score well on the Freedom House ratings for political rights and 
civil liberties. Freedom House ranks Timor-Leste as a ‘Partly Free’ polity. This is 
based on an assessment of political rights (3 on a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 the highest 
score) and civil liberties (4 on a scale of 1 to 7).  
 
‘Disciplined Governance’ 
 
There is, as well as the question of democracy, the question of the capacity of the 
state to assert its authority and perform its role. Where a national political elite 
attempts to govern a state that lacks the capacity to support effective government then 
a fundamental condition for democratic governance is missing.  
 
Jamie Mackie put the question this way: 
 
How should East Timor try to combine “disciplined governance and 
democratic principles”?   
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The minimum conditions for a successful and democratic polity include at the 
national political level reasonably cohesive governing elites working in a state system 
that has the human and financial resources to support government.  
 
In practice, Fretilin attempted to govern by creating a ‘dominant party’ (rather than a 
multiparty) system. Power was very much centred on the Council of Ministers and, 
behind this, the Fretilin Central Committee and its powerful National Political 
Commission. As Prime Minister and as Secretary-General of the party, Marí Alkatiri 
dominated both. In the event, it is fair to say that this ‘dominant party’ system did not 
work. What might be called the ‘directed democracy’ model ideologically favoured 
by the Fretilin leadership failed spectacularly in 2006. It was rejected by four out of 
five voters in the 2007 parliamentary elections.  
 
While other factors are critical, a stronger parliamentary system and a more open, 
pluralist political system in the long term can lower the level of political risk. A 
working parliamentary democracy can create a fund of social capital that supports a 
culture of mutual obligation and trust between society and the state. Poor levels of 
political rights and civil liberties contribute to political risk (Fish, 2006). The Timor-
Leste experience closely matches the model produced by political risk analysis from 
largely African case studies. On comparative rankings of political risk, Timor-Leste at 
independence was above the already high risk average for post-conflict African states 
(Collier et al, 2006; Shoesmith, 2007a). The crisis in 2006 demonstrated that the 
Fretilin Government was unable to reduce the level of political risk.  
 
The respective roles of the legislature and the executive 
 
The Fretilin Government, like Fretilin as a party, was highly centralised. To a 
significant extent, parliament was marginalised. The multiparty opposition in 
parliament was ineffectual. The outcome of the June, 2007 parliamentary elections 
reversed this order. The Fourth Constitutional Government of Xanana Gusmão is a 
loose coalition; in opposition, Fretilin has been disciplined and united.  
 
In the best case scenario, the National Parliament now has the opportunity to develop 
as a more robust and autonomous actor in the political process. With its experience of 
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government and its party discipline, Fretilin in opposition could use the parliament as 
a national forum for debate and scrutiny of government policy and of the political 
executive. Debate in the parliament is indeed more vigorous but the situation has 
become highly unstable. Rather than strengthening parliamentary democracy, the 
political struggle between Fretilin and the AMP Government and the instability within 
the governing coalition itself threaten to make the role of both parliament and the 
political executive unmanageable.  
 
The Constitutional Framework 
 
Constitutions and state institutions cannot of themselves guarantee democracy or 
effective government. They can, however, make the task of effective democratic 
governance easier or more difficult. Constitutions are more than written documents; 
they accumulate conventions and informal and well as formal political procedures.  
As the UNDP Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy project document noted the 
‘full character of the Timor-Leste’s constitutional system will evolve through practice 
over the coming years’ (UNDP 2006: 9).  
 
By the time the Constituent Assembly adopted a semi-presidential system in 2001, 
constitution writers had a wide array of constitutional models from which to choose. 
Newly independent states established following the Second World War, ‘tended 
simply to copy the basic constitutional rules of their former colonial masters, without 
seriously considering alternatives’ (Lijphart, 2006). The international consensus by 
the time the East Timorese came to consider a constitution was that 
parliamentarianism was a better choice than presidentialism or semi-presidentialism 
(Fish, 2006). The opportunity to consider a new constitutional framework for the new 
state was not taken up in 2001 by the Constituent Assembly. Nor was the constitution 
adopted by the Assembly the outcome of a genuine process of popular consultation 
and voter education (Shoesmith, 2007 b). Rather, Fretilin, which controlled the 
Assembly, ensured that a model the party had adopted in 1998 (following the 
Mozambique and Portuguese constitutions) would be installed.  
 
The experience of the first six years of independence strongly suggests that the 
current constitutional model is flawed and that there is a case for constitutional 
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reform. There is a case for a constitutional review (which is allowed for) to make the 
constitution more relevant to East Timor conditions. This could include 
reconsideration of the role of the Council of Ministers, of the legislative prerogatives 
that should be exercised by the parliament and of the relative roles of the president 
and the prime minister (see  Lijphart 2004 on power-sharing arrangements at the 
executive level). The Timor-Leste legal system is a complex, hybrid system of laws 
and regulations. A new constitution could clarify and streamline this. 
 
The presidency 
 
Under the constitution, the presidency has limited powers (Shoesmith, 2007b). A key 
indicator of institutionalised presidential power in a semi-presidential system is the 
ability (or lack of it) of the president to influence the appointment of cabinet 
ministers. The president does not have these powers in Timor-Leste. Constitutionally, 
the president does not play a role in the actual government of the state. The 
constitutional arrangements may not determine the degree of actual presidential 
influence in semi-presidential systems; there can be a strong inconsistency between 
the constitutional powers of the president and the president’s effective influence in 
government.  
 
President Gusmão from the first day of his term acted to test his actual powers and to 
chastise and challenge the Fretilin Government. In the First Constitutional 
Government, the semi-presidential system was one of ‘conflictual cohabitation’ in 
which the separately elected president and prime minister were divided by ideology 
and political conviction (Shoesmith, 2007b: 229). The political struggle was resolved 
in June, 2006, when the President obliged the Prime Minister to resign. 
 
The Constitution designates the president as “Supreme Commander of the Defence 
Force” but he shares responsibility for security policy with the government and 
parliament. The 2006 crisis increased the president’s influence in this area. President 
Ramos-Horta has suggested he leans towards a powerful French-style presidency, an 
‘enlightened autocracy’. By early 2008, an International Crisis Group report 
concluded that Ramos-Horta was not far from that already   (ICG, 2008).   
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Evidence that President Ramos-Horta’s instinct was to increase the powers of the 
presidency was provided by his move to set up an anti-poverty fund. This was 
intended to transfer from the National Parliament and the Government to the President 
budgetary and policy initiatives that were later ruled as unconstitutional by the Court 
of Appeals (Viegas, 2008). 
 
The separation of powers doctrine 
 
There is a ‘separation of powers’ doctrine in the Constitution (Section 69) that 
separates the parliament from the political executive in a way that is markedly 
different to the Westminster system. The Electoral Law requires members of 
parliament who are appointed to the government (that is, as ministers) to vacate their 
seats, to be replaced by the next candidate on their party list. Timor-Leste is by no 
means unique in this. Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands also require 
parliamentarians to resign their seats if they are appointed to cabinet (NDI, 2000: 11). 
These, however, are long-established consolidated democracies. Significant 
limitations on parliamentary democracy from the outset in a new state have probably 
vitiated the democratic transition in Timor-Leste. 
 
The Prime Minister is under no obligation to select ministers from elected 
representatives. Appointments are at the full discretion of the Prime Minister (more 
like the US presidential system than the Westminster parliamentary system in this 
respect). This power substantially weakens the parliament’s oversight role of the 
executive. Parliament’s access to ministers is reduced and the arrangement widens the 
gap between the political executive and the legislature that is already made formidable 
by the power of the Council of Ministers to issue its own Decree Laws. 
 
Decree Laws (Government Laws) and Parliamentary Laws 
 
The Constitution approves a dual system of law-making. Both the legislature and the 
political executive can make laws. Section 96 of the Constitution states that the 
National Parliament may authorise the Government (that is, the Council of Ministers) 
to make laws on a wide range of matters, including among others definitions of 
crimes, sentences and security measures, definition of civil and criminal procedures, 
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organisation of the judiciary, rules and regulations for civil servants, the monetary, 
banking and financial systems, environmental protection and sustainable 
development, and general rules and regulations for radio and television and other 
mass media.  Section 97 empowers the Government as well as parliament to initiate 
legislation. Section 98 (1) gives Parliament the power to appraise and amend or 
terminate statutes ‘other than those approved under the exclusive legislative powers of 
the Government’.  
 
The Council of Ministers’ autonomy from parliament is strengthened by its power to 
legislate through Decree Laws. There is some ambiguity in the Constitution 
concerning what legislation is the preserve of parliament and what can be enacted by 
the Council of Ministers (the Government). Section 115, Competence of the 
Government, states that it is incumbent on the Government ‘To submit bills and draft 
resolutions to the National Parliament’ (115 (2 a)). Further, ‘The Government has 
exclusive legislative powers on matters concerning its own organisation and 
functioning, as well as on the direct and indirect management of the State’ (115 (3)). 
Section 116, Competencies of the Council of Ministers, empowers the Council ‘to 
approve bills and draft resolutions’ (116 (c)) and ‘To approve statutes, as well as 
international agreements that are not required to be submitted to the National 
Parliament’ (116 (d)). It is not made clear what statutes are not required to be 
submitted to the National Parliament. 
 
The parliament passed an average of about eleven laws a year between 2002 and 
2006, the lowest number, four, in the crisis year of 2006. The Council of Ministers 
issued over eighty decree laws in the same period (East Timor Law Journal). While 
the majority of decree laws were concerned with administrative and regulatory 
matters, there was a tendency in the year before the 2007 parliamentary elections for 
the Council to consider legislation with important political consequences. The most 
controversial of these have been the proposed Penal Code legislation (2006) and the 
current debate over the proposed National Petroleum Authority Decree Law (2008). 
 
The decree law issue raises basic questions about the legislative authority of the 
parliament and the need for constitutional clarification regarding the legislative 
provenance of the Council of Ministers. The attempted Penal Code legislation and the 
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intention to pass the National Petroleum Authority Decree Law demonstrate that the 
Council of Ministers, both in a Fretilin government and in the present AMP 
government, understands its legislative powers in the broadest sense, regardless of the 
widespread political consequences of the decree laws it enacts. The Penal Code draft 
bill in 2006 and the current draft National Petroleum Authority bill are examples of 
the undemocratic risks in the current constitutional arrangements. Both clearly 
undermine the legislative authority of the parliament. 
 
The Penal Code legislation provides an instructive instance of the assumed power of 
the Council of Ministers to pass laws without reference to parliament that have major 
political consequences. The process for passing legislation as a Decree Law involves 
no public debate. On December 6, 2005 Prime Minister Alkatiri signed an executive 
decree approving the proposed law (JSMP, 2005; IPI, 2005). It was not sent back to 
the parliament for any process of endorsement but was directly forwarded to the 
President for promulgation.  
 
The Penal Code legislation provoked national and international criticism. The 
provisions in the Penal Code included severe, new penalties for defamation of 
political leaders and public servants. Critics attacked the legislation as restricting 
freedom of speech and removing political scrutiny, issues that were properly  the 
exclusive concern of the Parliament. The International Press Institute wrote to 
President Xanana Gusmão on January 12, 2006, to express its concern 
 
(a)bout plans to introduce a new penal code for East Timor containing harsh 
criminal penalties for individuals found guilty of defamation …. The new 
penal code contains several harsh sections that will have a detrimental impact 
on journalism within East Timor. 
The IPI called on the President to refuse to sign the new penal code and to 
block ‘a threat to freedom of the press and freedom of expression in East 
Timor’ (IPI, 2006).  
President Gusmão sent the decree back to the cabinet without promulgating it. The 
Alkatiri government fell before the decree could be reintroduced and the existing 
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defamation provisions of the Indonesian penal code continued to apply (US 
Department of State, 2006). 
The National Petroleum Authority Decree Law 
On June 2, 2008, the Council of Ministers released a draft of the proposed Decree 
Law to create a National Petroleum Authority (NPA) to replace the Timor Sea 
Designated Authority (TSDA) for the Joint Petroleum Development Area. The NPA 
is also intended to regulate all petroleum exploration, production, processing, sales 
and marketing, on-shore and offshore (La’o Hamutuk, 2008). The Council provided 
for a week of public consultation, setting 30 June as the deadline for establishing the 
NPA.  
 
La’o Hamutuk, the East Timorese NGO, submitted a response to the draft law on June 
10, expressing its alarm at the ‘many omissions and mistakes in the draft that fail to 
protect the public interest, including concentration of power, vague mandate, lack of 
transparency and accountability, other dangers of corruption, and ineffective 
monitoring of petroleum operations’. They made the case that this was a law that 
should be enacted by the parliament in open debate, ‘not a decree-law passed secretly 
by the Council of Ministers’. The powers of the NPA would compromise the policy-
making powers reserved for the Government and the Parliament (La’o Hamutuk, 
2008). 
 
The Budget 
 
There is one area of legislative power which is unambiguous. The key area for 
parliamentary responsibility is the budget. Section 145 (1), ‘Competence of the 
National Parliament’, requires that ‘The State Budget shall be prepared by the 
Government and approved by the National Parliament’. When submitted to the 
parliament the provisions in the budget are debated, amended and finally enacted or, 
possibly, rejected. Parliament’s Committee C Economy and Finance and Anti-
Corruption can play a central role in the scrutiny of the Government’s budget 
proposals.  Section 95 (2 e)) declares that it is exclusively incumbent upon the 
National Parliament to monitor the State Budget and this is a continuous role. The 
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state budget is a political as much as a financial statement. It is not a single event but 
rather a process that continues from one annual budget sitting to the next. A vigorous 
and alert parliament can hold the political executive to account and use the budget 
debates to mobilise public opinion (Eglin, 2003).  
 
When the AMP Government submitted its first budget to parliament in late 2007 it 
was subjected to intense scrutiny. Outside the parliament, the budget debate aroused 
widespread public interest. Phillip Adams, who was travelling through the districts in 
November, reported that ‘everywhere we heard battered radios … playing the 
parliamentary broadcasts from Dili’. Across the country people were listening to the 
budget debates (Adams, 2007). The budget was eventually passed after rigorous 
scrutiny, a case of the parliament playing a significant role in the formulation of core 
state policy. 
 
Parliament: An Assessment 
 
The National Parliament has a clear mandate and a working organisational system. By 
2006, the unicameral legislature and its staff were functioning, there was a 
parliamentary committee system in place, laws were enacted and annual budgets 
approved. It meets regularly and in the 2007 budget process acted expeditiously and 
effectively. The parliament is growing into its role but the UNDP (2006) assessment 
identified major weaknesses in its representative and legislative capacities. Public 
input into the legislative process remains limited. The parties in the AMP Coalition 
government are mostly new and untried. The legislative capacity of the parliament is 
extremely limited. The Secretariat does not employ legal advisers. Most laws are 
initiated by the Government which does have legal advisers. Many MPs lack basic 
language skills in Portuguese, the language of legislative business. The parliament has 
‘extremely limited in-house capacity for proper oversight’ of the executive (UNDP, 
2006: 15).  
 
The parliament does not yet adequately perform its oversight functions, holding the 
political executive to account. The parliament does provide a forum for policy 
discussion. Public input into the legislative process has been very limited (UNDP, 
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2006).  In-house law-making capacity was low. There were no legal advisers in the 
Secretariat to assist the members. Legal advice and legislative capacity were 
concentrated in the government and not the parliament (UNDP, 2006).  
 
On the Fish-Kroenig Parliamentary Powers Index (Fish, 2006), Timor-Leste’s score is 
low. Of the thirty-two criteria for a strong legislature, the National Parliament fails on 
at least thirteen. Ministers cannot serve simultaneously as members of the legislature; 
the parliament does not appoint the prime minister; it does not confirm ministerial 
appointments; the executive can decree legislation that does not require the 
parliament’s approval; individual members of parliament are not supported by 
personal staff, among others. 
 
The party-list system 
 
The electoral system itself diminishes the representational and accountable character 
of the parliament. The choice of electoral system is a fundamental issue for new 
democracies. It determines not only the recruitment of representatives but the 
subsequent relationship between the parliamentary members and the electorate, 
defining  key functions of representation and accountability. The electoral system in 
Timor-Leste is a party-list proportional representation system as required by Section 
65 (4) of the Constitution. The Law on the Election of the National Parliament, 
promulgated on 28 December, 2006 ( Law 6/2006) sets out that: ‘There shall be only 
one single constituency in the election of the National parliament, corresponding to 
the entire national territory, headquartered in Dili’ (Article 9). Members of parliament 
are elected through plurinominal lists presented by the political parties with each 
voting citizen entitled to one single vote in then list (Article 11).  East Timorese 
voters vote for parties, not individual candidates. The 2007 elections used a closed list 
system where seats were assigned to candidates in the fixed order that their party had 
chosen (Law 6/2006, Article 12 (2)). 
 
 The party-list system has advantages: it can ensure, for example, that candidate lists 
more equitably represent the population. The proportional representation system used 
in Timor-Leste’s 2007 parliamentary elections includes the requirement that every 
fourth candidate on the party-lists must be a woman (Law 6/2006 Article 12 (3)), 
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ensuring a minimum 25 per cent participation by women as candidates and as 
potential representatives. 
 
The electoral system does not produce a parliament that is genuinely representative 
and accountable to the electorate. There is no direct accountability between individual 
Members of Parliament and local constituencies (Norad, 2007: 66). The proportional 
party-list system means that voters do not decide which candidates they want in 
individual electorates. Members of Parliament have no compulsion to listen to an 
electorate; they simply have to persuade the party leaders to place them sufficiently 
high on the party list to gain a seat. This system disenfranchises the local community 
and discourages individual members from regularly visiting and consulting and 
therefore effectively representing local electorates.  
 
The Norad review (2007) found that key political actors were viewed as lacking 
‘democratic instincts’. Politicians focussed on the interests of their party and on 
personal relationships with party leaders that gave them their seat in parliament. 
Parliament ‘had limited ability to serve as a forum for public debate, or a channel for 
the participation and concerns of citizens’ (Norad, 2007: 66).  
 
A disloyal opposition 
 
The systemic weaknesses in the parliamentary and electoral regimes are compounded 
by the intensity of the political struggle between government and opposition. Fretilin 
rejects the role of a ‘loyal opposition’. It is determined to remove a government that it 
declares ‘unconstitutional’ and corrupt. Fretilin won twenty-one seats in the election, 
making it the largest party in the new parliament. It was opposed by Xanana 
Gusmão’s Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor-Leste (CNRT) with 
eighteen seats. In the negotiations following the elections Fretilin failed to persuade 
the other parties to join it in a coalition and President Ramos-Horta, on 6 August, 
announced the CNRT and four other parties would form government as the 
Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP). The announcement provoked a violent 
reaction from Fretilin supporters. Alkatiri declared Ramos-Horta’s decision 
‘unconstitutional’. Fretilin has since dismissed the AMP Coalition as a mere ‘de 
facto’ government, demanding new elections.  
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With the installation of the AMP Coalition government led by Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmão, parliament assumed a more vigorous role as a forum for national debate. 
Paradoxically, this has presented a major threat to the viability of the parliamentary 
system itself. Fretilin in opposition denounces the AMP-led Government as 
unconstitutional, referring to it as a ‘de facto Government’. In August, 2007, Fretilin 
spokesman José Teixieira  announced ‘We still consider the current government 
unlawful and will have no part of it’ (Teixeira, 2007).  Fretilin leaders called for the 
Government to step down and for early elections to be held in 2009 (Alkatiri, 2008).  
 
The AMP Coalition is unstable. The five parties share some thirteen ministries 
(including the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Minister), three vice-ministries and 
twenty-five secretariats of state. The political executive in the AMP Coalition is 
undisciplined.  The Council of Ministers in the Fretilin government acted slowly and 
sometimes ineffectively (Norad, 2007: 45) but it was politically united. The AMP 
Council of Ministers is divided between parties who are not natural allies. Individual 
ministers have been accused by Fretilin of gross abuse of their positions. The Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries was accused in May, 2008 of approving secret massive 
land leases to Indonesian companies (Teixeira, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The constitutional and electoral ground rules in Timor-Leste are in need of reform if 
the system is to become more democratic and at the same time more capable of 
delivering more disciplined governance. The case is made, following Fish’s study, 
that in the longer term a strong parliament will contribute to a more open and 
democratic political system and engender popular respect for the government and the 
state it represents. This is an essential condition for the development of a confident 
civil society in Timor-Leste which, in turn, is an essential condition for political 
stability (among others). 
 
 The relationship between the political executive and the legislature in the past 
has too strongly empowered the executive. The Council of Ministers has wide-ranging 
legislative powers of it own, ministers do not and cannot sit in parliament and, if the 
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Prime Minister chooses, may not even be elected to parliament in the first place. This 
provides the political executive with far too much independence from the people’s 
representatives. Members of Parliament themselves are not elected by specific 
electorates and, in the party-list system, are not accountable to local communities.  
 
In considering reforms for the parliamentary system, it is suggested that there 
is a need for constitutional clarification of the respective legislative roles of the 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers with the direction of reform aimed at giving 
the Parliament control of legislation that, like the Penal Code law, has significant 
consequences for the democratic governance of the country. The constitutional 
provisions for elections and the Electoral Law should be reviewed and either the Party 
List proportional system replaced by a single electorate system or the adoption of a 
mixed system of individual electorates for individual candidates as well as some Party 
List candidates. The work of Parliament should be better supported by the training 
and appointment of expert advisers on legislative processes, budget and finance. The 
Secretariat requires a stronger human resource base. 
 
A strong opposition can strengthen parliamentary democracy but there is a 
need for areas of consensus and cooperation, an agreement to play by the rules. It may 
be possible to adopt more inclusive strategies to provide the opposition with a greater 
opportunity to participate in policy making even though the government of the day 
retains final control over this.  
 
The opposition role in the parliamentary committee system could be 
developed leading, for instance, to a system of minority committee reports where 
agreement was not reached. Committees can serve a critical function in both the 
legislative process and exercising oversight of the ministry. A shadow ministry could 
be introduced where opposition shadow ministers assumed responsibility for 
developing an understanding of a specific are of policy, thereby being in a position to 
offer informed critiques of government decisions while preparing to assume that 
ministerial authority if a change of government were to occur. It will be difficult to 
achieve a consensus on what reforms are required and how they are to be 
implemented. This will take a degree of consensus that is not currently present. But if 
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parliamentary democracy in Timor-Leste is to be strengthened from its present fragile 
condition, reform is unavoidable. 
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